Philosophy & Science, Public Theology & Christian Living

by Douglas Groothuis –

This article will address prudential considerations with respect to Christian belief. Prudence, as I use the term here, concerns personal benefit and detriment in matters of belief in general and concerning Christianity in particular. Life today provides us with panoply of possible beliefs about a plethora of topics, and many face this welter of worldviews with a stupefied indifference. Those so anaesthetized will, of course, show no interest at all in pursuing Christian truth claims. The best arguments concerning the greatest issues, if unheeded, do no good. So, a vital part of apologetics must address how to stimulate interest in Christian topics. In a world awash with spiritual options, playing the prudence card is not unwarranted—if and only if it is done tactfully and respectfully and in a way that comports with our sense of prudence in other areas of life.

We all must develop some considered beliefs about our professions in order to flourish within them. Beliefs about our health are taken quite seriously as well. An ambiguous physical symptom that could indicate a serious medical threat needs to be investigated. But what about belief-pursuits that are more elective? What beliefs are necessities and what beliefs are luxuries? What should we even consider worthy of belief or unbelief? Elsewhere I have argued that the virtuous person pursues truth and follows it wherever it may lead. I also claimed that knowledge of Christian truth claims is possible and desirable.² But this response, while required for intellectual rectitude, gives but part of the answer. One should believe what is true and well supported by evidence. But what truth-claims should claim our attention in the first place? In other words, where should we direct our investigations on matters of truth and falsity?

Pascal on Prudence in Religious Belief
It should be no surprise that Christians contend that non-Christians should investigate the claims and credentials of Christianity. Christians often encourage this on the basis of their own experiences. Christ changed their lives for the better, and he can do the same for others who come to him on his terms. This approach is fitting, so long as it does not devolve into pragmatism. Nevertheless, it is only part of the incentive that may be needed for an unbeliever. While keeping a firm backbone of objective truth, Christian apologetics should also commend Christianity on a prudential basis. Here, we can invoke some insights from Blaise Pascal’s famous and much-debated wager argument. My concern here is not to defend Pascal against his critics,³ but rather to apply the heart of his argument to the apologetic situation today (along with some help from William James).

Unlike many philosophical debates, the wager captures the imagination and triggers strong passions on both sides. I once heard a philosophy graduate admit that he was not a Christian because of the way the wager argument was presented to him. One of my own Christian students had such an aversion to this argument that he refused to attend my lecture on it. But before tackling objections to the wager, a clearer understanding of the role of prudence in belief-formation needs to be developed.

We first should note that Pascal is not advising that one treat God as merely a means to the end of escaping hell and inheriting eternal life. However, the prudential aspects should play a strong role in stimulating one’s interest in Christianity’s truth claims. Pascal believes that by emphasizing these prudential concerns the apologist may elicit the religious interest of an otherwise unconcerned unbeliever. However, Pascal wants the unbeliever to reach true faith:

True conversion consists in self-annihilation before the universal being whom we have so often vexed and who is perfectly entitled to destroy us at any moment. . . . It consists in knowing that there is an irreconcilable opposition between God and us, and that without a mediator there can be no [salvation].⁴

Let us move on to Pascal’s prudential considerations proper.

Succinctly put, if Christianity is true and one becomes a Christian, there is much to gain and little of ultimate importance to lose. Pascal says, if one is a Christian and Christianity is true, there is “an infinity of an infinitely happy life to be won.”⁵ He is speaking of the eternal state of the believer, who dwells with God in a restored creation with all the redeemed (see Rev. 21:1-22:6). We may add to this the benefit of knowing the truth in this life and receiving the divine blessings of a restored relationship with God and the privilege of seeking and serving a kingdom that cannot be shaken (Matt. 16:9; Heb. 12:28). If one receives these temporal and eternal benefits, one also escapes the pains of hell, although Pascal does not mention hell overtly in his famous argument. Moreover, if Christianity is true and one becomes a Christian, one also becomes an instrument of truth and goodness in the world in a way not otherwise possible. This introduces an altruistic element to the equation. ⁶ Of course, a true follower of Christ will repent of and thus lose some worldly enjoyments (Rom. 12:1-2; 1 John 2:15-17); she also inherits a tension with the world system that can result in religious persecution by family, friends, strangers, or the state. But even in this, those so afflicted are “blessed,” because “great is their reward in heaven” (Matt. 5:11-12; see also 1 Pet. 4:12-19). Yet Jesus does challenge his potential disciples to “count the cost” of following him. His way is not a casual endeavor or a hobby for one’s spare time:

Then he said to them all: “Whoever wants to be my disciple must deny themselves and take up their cross daily and follow me. For whoever wants to save their life will lose it, but whoever loses their life for me will save it. What good is it for you to gain the whole world, and yet lose or forfeit your very self?” (Luke 9:23-26).

In the same passage that Jesus speaks of the cost of following him, he also warns of the greater cost—an eternal one—of not following him. Jesus was not afraid to marshal the resources of prudence, although he did not limit his argumentation to such warnings.⁷

On the other hand, if Christianity is true and one fails to become a Christian, there is much to lose and little of final importance to gain. Even Anthony Flew, writing (at that time) as an atheist, realized this: “If there is a chance at all that we are in danger of unending misery, then knowledge which might show us how this is to be avoided must become overwhelmingly important.”⁸ How, then, might the apologist engender a concern for knowledge in this area?

Prudential Considerations and Activities
If one takes a basic inventory of one’s beliefs (what constitutes one’s noetic structure),⁹ one realizes that some beliefs are more important than others; that is, some beliefs have more existential impact on ourselves and on the world around us than other beliefs. For example, discerning whether someone would make a worthy mate is no small matter. Marriage is a serious endeavor carrying with it very high stakes, since one is choosing one’s most intimate friend and life partner. On the other hand, beliefs about the relative greatness of sports figures, while interesting, hardly carry the same consequences. So, it is rational to spend more effort investigating one’s potential marriage than debating who the greatest hitter in the history of baseball might be.¹⁰

But many want to remain uncommitted and apathetic about Christian claims. To this, Pascal argues that one must wager for or against Christianity. Uncommitted agnosticism is not an option: “There is no choice, you are already committed. Which will you choose then?”¹¹ With regard to the truth or error of two mutually exclusive propositions A and B, one can (1) believe A (and so disbelieve B) or (2) believe B (and so disbelieve A) or (3) suspend judgment about A and B. Although one could remain uncommitted concerning Christianity, the option becomes “forced,” to use William James’s term, when a prudential element is added.¹² We cannot avoid the issue by remaining skeptical because, “although we do avoid error in that way if religion be untrue, we lose the good, if it be true, just as certainly as if we positively chose to disbelieve.”¹³

In other words, not to believe in Christianity, either as a committed unbeliever or as an agnostic, means to forfeit the benefits promised only to the believer (eternal life), should Christianity be true. Deciding not to choose has the same result as not believing in God. In this sense, “you are already committed.” In the final analysis, to be apathetic is to be antithetical to Christ. As he said, “Whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters” (Matt. 12:30). Our lease on earthly life is of limited duration, and we don’t know when it will be up. Therefore, the decision should weigh heavily on us. In William James’s words, such a decision is “momentous” and not “trivial” because the stakes are high, the opportunity is unique, and the choice is irreversible.¹⁴ What lends urgency to the situation, as Pascal mentions elsewhere, is that if one dies “without worshipping the true principle” (that is, the true God), one is forever lost.¹⁵

Pascal denounces indifference toward religion as violating the principles of reasonable self-interest. Here he narrates the speech of a skeptic who expresses his utter lostness in the cosmos:

Just as I do not know whence I come, so I do not know whither I am going. All I know is that when I leave this world I shall fall forever into nothingness or into the hands of a wrathful God, but I do not know which of these two states is to be my eternal lot. Such is my state, full of weakness and uncertainty. And my conclusion from all this is that I must pass my days without a thought of seeking what is to happen to me. Perhaps I might find some enlightenment in my doubts, but I do not want to take the trouble…¹⁶

At this point, Pascal issues four red-hot questions.

Who would wish to have as a friend a man who argued like that? Who would choose him from among others as a confidant in his affairs? Who would resort to him in adversity? To what use in life could he possibly be turned? (427/194)

These questions are not mere ad hominem attacks; they form an argument. If it is a good thing to be a trustworthy friend, and if such a friend would never be as nonchalant as the skeptic, then it is not a good thing to be a negligent, skeptical person. This kind of skeptic has failed to discharge a basic human duty to investigate matters of extreme moment. In confronting this intellectual indolence, Pascal is as much an existential therapist as a philosopher. He realizes that he must treat such worldly complacency with explosives by stimulating the imagination, as in this memorable parable.

A man in a dungeon, not knowing whether sentence has been passed on to him, with only an hour left to find out, and that hour enough, once he knows it has been passed, to have it revoked. It would be unnatural for him to spend that hour not finding out whether sentence has been passed by playing piquet¹⁷

Pascal challenges us to face our mortality. But unlike Martin Heidegger, who in his Being and Time saw humanity’s “being unto death” as a call to live authentically for a finite period of time, Pascal wants to spark a hope for transcendence, for an infinite life conferred by God’s grace in Christ.

If Christianity is true, the prudential benefits for by believing in atheism or any other worldview (finite pleasures). The prudential detriments of not believing if Christianity is true (loss of eternal life; gaining of hell) also far outweigh the detriments of not believing atheism or another other worldview¹⁸ if the nonChristian view is true (loss of finite pleasures). Pascal is right to affirm that eternal bliss outweighs any finite good and eternal loss is far worse than mere extinction.¹⁹

Prudential Concerns and Other Religions
Only other religion is as prudentially charged as Christianity: Islam. It, too, claims that being a Muslim is the only sure way to eternal felicity. So, given prudential concerns, why should one investigate Christianity over Islam? First, prudential matters do not determine beliefs, they merely prime the pump for investigation and consideration. One must consider the credibility of any religious claim in addition to its prudential promises. Elsewhere I assess the essential claims of Islam and find them intellectually wanting.²⁰ This fact in itself would cancel out Islam’s numerous threats of hell for those who do not submit to Allah. Second, Islam makes no promise of eternal life to any of its followers. Unless one dies in a jihad, no Muslim is given certainty as to whether or not he will enter paradise. One can only hope that one’s good deeds outweigh one’s bad deeds or that Allah will somehow show mercy.

Christianity could not be more dissimilar on this score. Christ and the apostles promise eternal life (beginning in the here and now) to the true believer on the basis of God’s love and grace (Rom. 8:16), which is received by faith alone (Eph. 2:8-9). Jesus promised this: “I am the resurrection and the life. Anyone who believes in me will live, even though they die; and whoever lives by believing in me will never die” (John 11:25-26). So, if Christianity is true, one can find assurance of salvation; if Islam is true, one can only work for salvation and hope one ends up in paradise. Of the two options, Christianity is, then, much more attractive. Of course, truth claims are not decisively settled by which ones are the most attractive, but Christianity, if true, would offer far more to the believer than would Islam if it were true. Thus, the seeker is prudentially justified in investigating Christianity first.

Contemporary Judaism holds a variety of beliefs on the afterlife.²¹ The more orthodox schools of Judaism affirm the existence of eternal states of reward or punishment. However, conservative Jews believe that non-Jews can be acceptable to God through obeying basic moral commands; they do not have to be Jewish to be acceptable to God. Jews may believe that Gentiles are missing the richness of religious life by not engaging in Judaism, but the Gentiles’ nonparticipation in Judaism per se has no eternally deleterious consequences. So, the prudential incentive to consider Judaism is far less than that offered by Christianity and Islam.²²

To illustrate this prudential principle, consider a more pedestrian scenario. In considering two insurance companies, one reads that Company A’s benefits far exceed company B’s benefits. But at this point the interested person knows nothing else about Company A and B. If so, all things being equal, it is more rational to pursue the facts about Company A rather than Company B. This is, of course, a prima facie consideration; it could be that Company A makes false promises and Company B delivers on its less impressive benefits.

Other religions lacking the doctrines of heaven and hell may also offer prudential incentives, but they are less charged prudentially than Christianity and Islam. Both Hinduism and Buddhism teach the doctrine of reincarnation, wherein the postmortem state is not seen as necessarily eternal. Any number of lifetimes may be needed to neutralize bad karma and attain ultimate enlightenment, after which one escapes samsara (the wheel of rebirth) and need not reincarnate. According to Hinduism and Buddhism, if one wagers incorrectly—say on Islam or Christianity—in this life, a religious adjustment is available in another incarnation. But Christianity (Hebrew 9:27) and Islam offer no such second (or millionth) chance.²³ The stakes are higher and the time allotted to wager is far shorter—one life. Therefore, even if one finds the apologetic case for Hinduism or Buddhism plausible, given the prudential considerations of Christianity and Islam, one should attempt to rule out these high risk monotheistic faiths before pursuing Hinduism or Buddhism—unless, of course, one deems Hinduism or Buddhism so intellectually superior that one can find no rational interest in Christianity or Islam at all.

Even if other spiritual experiments were conceivable, this would not, in itself, undermine the prudential and evidential warrant of a Pascalian experiment. If one becomes convinced through the spiritual experiment that one has sufficient reason, both epistemic and prudential, to believe in the hidden God as the true God, then further experiments would not be in order in light of Christianity’s claims to religious sufficiency and uniqueness. Yet this does not mean that one could not choose to cease believing in Christianity. But as long as one believes, no other quests are appropriate because religious faith—more than the initial spiritual experiment—makes a total demand on a person.²⁴

Emotion, Reason and Religious Belief
Despite all the prudential reasons to seek Christian faith, and even though we may see the benefits in believing, belief often remains difficult to attain because of emotional dispositions, fears or loves that keep us from seriously considering an alternative. Pascal realized this, and famously urged the one considering Christian faith for prudential reasons to act in religious ways in the hope that faith might emerge. Pascal is often accused of religious brainwashing in this regard. But he is not here suggesting that one simply become habituated to the proposition “God exists,” such that one comes to believe it. This protocol would give no rational justification for the belief. Habituation is not argumentation. If the genesis of any belief is reducible to habituation alone (sans epistemic considerations), then that belief is not epistemically justified. However, there is a more charitable and philosophically promising understanding of Pascal’s advice.

An unbeliever’s passions may inhibit belief when prudential reason would otherwise impel him to believe. Thus, one should consider attempting to neutralize these inhibiting passions such that belief becomes possible. This is not brainwashing, but a kind of testing. Pascal says elsewhere in a dialogue:

‘I should have given up a life of pleasure,’ they say, ‘if I had faith.’ But I tell you: ‘You would soon have faith if you gave up a life of pleasure. Now it is up to you to begin. If I could give you faith, I would. But I cannot, nor can I test the truth of what you say, but you can easily give up your pleasure and test whether I am telling the truth.’²⁵

As an Augustinian, Pascal believed that a person was essentially motivated by either lust or charity—in other words, by one’s fallen nature or by grace. If one is dominated by lust, religious truth is unavailable. If one is willing to suspend or at least attenuate foul passions, charity may break through and faith may ensue. For example, Jesus says to some unbelieving religious leaders, “How can you believe [in me] when you seek approval from others?” (John 5:44). He contends that prideful regard for status could keep one from seeing the truth.

Along these lines, consider the case of a prideful actor named Charles who, now past his prime, refuses to recognize the brilliance of a younger actor, Rodney, who is superbly executing the roles Charles once excelled in performing. But because of his age, Charles can no longer play the parts that once made him famous and which are now catapulting Rodney into fresh celebrity. The elder’s pride and jealousy blinds him to the talents of his younger “rival.” But Charles is counseled by a wise friend—who is interested in reconciling him to Rodney—to watch Rodney’s best acting performances on video three times within one week. In so doing, the friend hopes that Charles’s obtuseness will be overcome. Charles reluctantly agrees and later confesses Rodney’s greatness, along with admitting the blindness of his former pride. Now he has eyes to see.²⁶

Pascal’s recommendation of religious practices does not advise brainwashing, but rather a vulnerability to persuasion through various religious practices that may serve to temper the passions and thus open one to certain claims not otherwise convincing and to experiences not otherwise possible. Pascal elsewhere speaks of habituation or “custom” as helping to ground certain beliefs in a rational manner.²⁷

Is it True Faith?
Critics argue that wagering faith little resembles true religious faith for at least two reasons. First, one cannot be said to have faith if there is any tentativeness involved. The idea of testing a commitment with an experiment is inherently irreligious because religion demands absolute faith and commitment. Second, wagering faith is rejected because it is cultivated only to save one’s own skin and get a heavenly payoff; it is merely mercenary.

First, Pascal’s Christian tradition offers incentives for those not yet fully convinced to seek fuller assurance. Jesus advises that if his hearers ask, seek, and knock they will receive an answer (Matt. 7:7-8). When Jesus is confronted by a man who pleads, “I do believe, help me overcome my unbelief,” he does not rebuke the man but responds to his imperfect faith and grants him his desire (Mark 9:14-29). Jesus also comments that faith as small as a mustard seed is sufficient for great things (Matt. 17:20).

Second, one who wagers on God need not be a religious mercenary who commits all intellectual and moral integrity to the flames for the off chance of infinite reward. One need not transgress any intellectual or ethical standard by wagering on God. Self-interest, a normal human regard, need not be selfish (see Eph. 5:29). Jesus invoked self-interest, along with a comparison of finite and infinite goods, when he asked, “What good will it be for you to gain the whole world, yet forfeit your soul? Or what can you give in exchange for your soul?” (Matt. 16:25-26).

The wager can be seen as a first step in the process of possible belief development.²⁸ Because beliefs cannot just be taken up at will a process is undertaken which may result in full-fledged belief, if certain conditions obtain. Pascal himself is aware of the difference between true conversion and prudential exploration. The wager appeals to self-interest, but precludes brute selfishness if for no other reason than that the one wagering must begin to inhibit his worldly passions for the sake of religious participation. Pascal crisply articulates the meaning of robust faith as against leaner varieties:

True conversion consists in self-annihilation before the universal being whom we have so often vexed and who is perfectly entitled to destroy us at any moment. . . . It consists in knowing that there is an irreconcilable opposition between God and us, and that without a mediator there can be no [salvation].²⁹

To act as if one believes means to engage in activities thought to build or strengthen faith. This could include involvement with religious services, the reading of Scripture and devotional materials, prayer and meditation, and association with believers on matters of spiritual concern. This kind of active participation need not be a case of uncritical engagement, but rather of sympathetic involvement. Ninian Smart has rightly observed that philosophers have tended to treat religious questions as merely metaphysical assertions in abstraction. Yet some sympathetic imagination and even participation is required to understand a religious claim in the holistic milieu in which it functions, even if this falls short of total commitment.³⁰ Pascal emphasizes both the cognitive and physical sides of spirituality:

We must combine outward and inward to obtain anything from God; in other words, we must go down on our knees, pray with our lips, etc. . . . If we expect help from this outward part we are superstitious, if we refuse to combine it with the inward part we are being arrogant.³¹

The conclusion is that one may act “as if” one were a believer, but only if hypocrisy and self-deception are ruled out. Pascal certainly does not want to encourage self-deception: “Men often take their imagination for their heart, and often believe they are converted as soon as they start thinking of becoming converted.”³²

Prudence, Truth and Apologetics
The case for Christianity stands or falls on the arguments presented on its behalf and the arguments presented against pertinent worldview rivals. But these arguments will have no effect unless people seriously investigate them. A prudential consideration of the Christian truth claim can, when offered wisely, invoke a healthy self-interest that encourages unbelievers to inquire into Christianity. Further, since we are not merely disembodied intellects—but beings of emotion and will, as well—the investigation of Christianity should also include exposure to its public expression, its forms and practices. This could be called a “devotional experiment.”

As Pascal observed, these activities (along with rational reflection) may help one truly discern the state of one’s own soul before God and the glories of the Christian revelation itself.

Douglas Groothuis (Ph.D.) is professor of philosophy at Denver Seminary. This article is taken from Christian Apologetics: A Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith by Douglas Groothuis. Copyright(c) 2011. Used by permission of InterVarsity Press PO Box 1400 Downers Grove, IL 60515. www.ivpress.com.

¹ Blaise Pascal, Pensées, ed. Alban Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin Books, 1966), 387/241, p. 143.
²See chapter seven of my Christian Apologetics: A Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity, 2011).
³See Douglas Groothuis, “Wagering a Life on God,” chap. 9 in Groothuis, On Pascal (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003).
⁴Pascal, Pensées, 378/470, p. 137-38.
⁵ Pascal, Pensées 418/233, p. 151.
⁶Peter Kreeft, Christianity for Modern Pagans (St. Louis: Ignatius Press, 1993), 297.
⁷See Douglas Groothuis, On Jesus (Wadsworth, 2003), chapters one and three especially.
⁸Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005), 34.
⁹On noetic structure, see Ronald Nash, Faith and Reason (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1988), 21-24.
¹⁰The answer is Ted Williams.
¹¹Pascal, Pensées, 418/233, 150
¹²See William Rowe, Philosophy of Religion (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1978), 178-180. 
¹³William James, The Will to Believe (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), 26.
¹⁴Ibid., 3-4. We should amend James by noting that one may put off a religious decision or change one’s religious beliefs before one’s death. However, in biblical language, one may so “harden one’s heart” that such a deathbed conversion becomes a psychological impossibility.
¹⁵Pascal, Pensées,158/236, p. 82.
¹⁶Pascal, Pensées, 427/194, p. 158.
¹⁷Pascal, Pensées,163/200, p. 82.
¹⁸Unless Islam is true, since Islam, like Christianity, threatens hell and promises heaven. This is discussed below.
¹⁹Pascal does not overtly mention hell in the wager, but it seems implied; he endorses the doctrine of eternal punishment in Pensées (152/213), p. 79, which emphasizes the fragility of life situated between heaven and hell.
²⁰See chapter 24 of my Christian Apologetics.
²¹ For an overview of Judaism, see Winfried Corduan, Neighboring Faiths (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press,
1998), 45-76.
²²This article will not offer a critique of Judaism in itself. As a defense of Christianity, it claims that the Hebrew Bible (or Old Testament) is divinely inspired. However, the arguments for Jesus as the Messiah entail that Christianity is the fulfillment of Judaism.
²³Some have argued for a post-mortem opportunity for salvation, but the biblical evidence for this is quite weak.
²⁴See Douglas Groothuis, “Obstinacy in Religious Belief,” Sophia 32, no. 2 (July 1993): 25-35.
²⁵Pascal, Pensées, 816/240, p. 273; emphasis added.
²⁷For more on this, See Douglas Groothuis, “Wagering Belief: Examining Two Objections to Pascal’s Wager,” Religious Studies 30 (1994): 479-86.
²⁸Pascal, Pensées, 821/252, p. 274.
²⁹See Nicholas Rescher, Pascal’s Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 117-133.
³⁰Pascal, Pensées, 378/470, p. 137.
³¹Ninian Smart, The Philosophy of Religion (New York: Random House, 1970), 25.
³²Pascal, Pensées, 944/250, p. 324.
³³Pascal, Pensées, 975/275, p. 347.
³⁴For more on the evidential value of a spiritual or devotional experiment, see Caroline F. Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Davies, however, extends the religious experiment idea justifying religions other than Christianity.

(First published in Areopagus Journal Vol. 11 No. 1 – Questions on the Divine Attributes)