World Religions

by Steven Cowan –

Atheist philosopher Michael Martin has been at bat many times in his attempt to undermine the Christian faith intellectually. In his latest “at bat” [“Three Arguments for Nonbelief,” Free Inquiry 21:4 (Fall 2001): 50-53], Martin offers “three fresh arguments” to justify nonbelief in God. This issue’s Disputations will give a rebuttal to each one, showing that Martin strikes out again.

Strike One: The Argument from Incoherence

The first swing that Martin takes is to argue that the concept of God is incoherent in the way that a “round square” is incoherent. First he argues that the Bible’s portrayal of God is inconsistent. He points, for instance, to several biblical texts which teach that God is invisible and has never been seen by men (e.g., Col.1:15; I Tim. 1:17; John 1:18; I John 4:12). Then he directs our attention to people in the Bible who apparently saw God such as Abraham and Moses (Gen. 12:7; Exod. 6:3). So, apparently the Bible portrays God as both invisible and visible.

But the biblical authors would not be guilty of so obvious a contradiction as this. A charitable interpretation tells us that when John the Baptist said that “no one has ever seen God” (John1:18), he was not ignorant of Moses’ and Jacob’s encounters with God. John understood what every child knows when he reads the Bible, namely, that God is an invisible Spirit who cannot literally be seen by the human eye. Nevertheless, God has manifested his presence indirectly at various times in history, appearing as a man (or angel) to Abraham and Jacob, as a burning bush and fiery pillar to Moses, etc. These non-literal “seeings” of God can truly be described as encounters with God without undermining the truth that God cannot be literally and directly seen.

What Martin fails to consider is that the verb “see” can be used metaphorically as well as literally. I can “see” the tree outside my window and I can also “see” the point of Martin’s argument. Why then can’t he see that when Moses “saw” God, he only saw God in some non-literal or indirect way in a physical phenomenon by which God manifested his presence? Moses did not have to see God’s actual essence or being to rightly be said to have “seen” God.

Martin also questions the consistency of the Bible’s view of God by saying that the Bible portrays God as both having and lacking mercy. But in none of the texts he cites does it say that God lacks the attribute of mercy. Martin points merely to some occasions in which God chooses not to be merciful to specific people (e.g., the Canaanites). But God’s being merciful does not entail that he is always merciful to everyone. For God to be merciful, all that is required is that he extends mercy to at least one undeserving sinner. And the Bible is clear that God has the right to show and withhold mercy at his discretion (Rom. 9:18).

Martin also claims that the Bible presents God “in some places as a being who repents and changes his mind, in others as a being who never repents and changes his mind. . .” (p. 50). Martin is right that there are texts that claim that God does not repent (e.g. Num. 23:19), as well as texts in which God apparently repents (Gen. 6:6). Yet there is no contradiction if we understand the latter in a non-literal way (which Christians have always done). In these texts God only appears to repent (because outward circumstances change) or he simply expresses his displeasure at the actions of men. Martin gives us no reason why we can’t read these texts in this way.

Martin also brings up some classic puzzles concerning God’s omniscience. He points out that there are three kinds of knowledge: propositional knowledge (knowledge that some fact is true), procedural knowledge (knowledge how to do some activity), and knowledge by acquaintance (experiential knowledge of some person, place, or thing).

Now, says Martin, God is supposed to be omniscient, which means that he is all-knowing. But, there’s a problem. Since God has no physical body, he can’t possibly have all procedural knowledge. For example, only someone with a body can know how to swim. Also, since God is morally perfect, he can’t have all knowledge by acquaintance. For example, God cannot know what it is like to feel lust and envy.

Martin is absolutely right. God cannot know how to swim or what it is like to experience lust and envy. And if the concept of omniscience required that God have such knowledge, then God could not exist. But when Christians say that God is all knowing, all that they mean (and all they need to mean) is that God has all propositional knowledge. God knows all the facts, and none of his beliefs are false. And to say that God does not have all procedural and experiential knowledge imposes no limitation or imperfection on God. Quite the contrary. To say that God doesn’t know how to swim is actually a perfection for an omnipresent, unembodied being. And we consider it a good thing for a being not to be able to experience lust and envy.

Strike Two: The Argument from Nonbelief

There are lots of people who don’t believe in God. Martin thinks this is good reason for everyone to disbelieve in God. Why? Because, says Martin, Christians believe that

(1) God is merciful and all-loving, compassionate and caring towards humanity;
(2) The Bible and only the Bible, is the source of God’s word;
(3) God wants all humans to be saved;
(4) A necessary condition for being saved is becoming aware of the Word of God and accepting it.

Martin contends that it makes no sense that there would be any unbelievers in the world because, if (1) – (4) were true, God would make sure that it is more obvious than it is that the Bible is his word, and he would make sure that everyone has access to it. In other words, Martin believes that if God exists and wants everyone to be saved, then God would act so as to clear up all doubt and disbelief. But, he hasn’t. So he doesn’t exist.

Martin’s conclusion depends entirely on the truth of statements (1) – (4) above, statements he attributes to Christians. But the Christian need not accept all of these statements, at least not in the sense Martin intends.

Statements (2) and (4) are unobjectionable. But (1) and (3) are not. Take statement (1). The Bible gives us no reason to accept it. As shown earlier, the Bible does not teach that God is merciful to everyone. He is merciful to whom he pleases. And though God does love everyone in some way, he doesn’t love everyone the same way. To some sinners, God patiently endures their rebellion in this life, even giving them many blessings. But to other sinners, God (for his own good purpose) extends his saving grace by sending them the word of God and powerfully drawing them to faith in Christ (John 6:44; 10:25-29).

Statement (3) says that God wants all humans to be saved. Two biblical texts seem to support this (I Tim. 2:4; 2 Pet. 3:9). Martin is apparently unaware, however, of the debate among Christian over the interpretation of these texts. Yet even supposing that those texts do teach that God wants all people without exception to be saved, Martin’s conclusion doesn’t follow. There are different senses in which God may want this. That is, does God’s desire expressed in these texts express his ultima facie desire or merely his prima facie desire? In other words, is it the case that God actually designs and intends that all people be saved, or is it merely that he would be pleased if all were saved? If the former, then Martin’s argument has force. However, if God has other desires and intentions, then these might override or supercede his mere prima facie desire to save all people. Many biblical texts support that there are other desires that God intends to fulfill (see esp. Rom. 9:22-24) which prevent him from acting so as to guarantee the salvation of all people. This being the case, Martin’s argument from nonbelief is another strike.

Strike Three: Bradley’s Moral Argument

For his third swing, Martin presents the argument developed by Raymond Bradley, which starts with the following assertions:

(1) Any act that God commits, causes, commands, or condones is morally permissible.
(2) The Bible reveals to us many of the acts that God commits, causes, commands, or condones.
(3) It is morally impermissible for God to commit, cause, command, or condone acts that violate our moral principles.
(4) The Bible tells us that God does in fact commit, cause, command, or condone acts that violate our moral principles.

Martin rightly claims that these assertions are inconsistent. So, the rational person should reject at least one of them. Martin would support rejecting (2), but the Christian would reject (4). Yet, Martin points to certain apparent atrocities in the Old Testament which he thinks makes (4) undeniable.

In response, I will argue that the Christian can rightly reject three of the above assertions. First of all, (1) is ambiguous. It could be taken in either of these ways:

(1′) Any act that God commits, causes, commands, or condones is morally permissible for anyone.
(1″) Any act that God commits, causes, commands, or condones is morally permissible for God.

The distinction between (1′) and (1″) rests on the fact that something might be morally permissible for the Creator which is not permissible for the creature. For example, it is plausible to believe that it is permissible for God to demand worship though it is not permissible for me to do so. So, if we take (1) to mean (1′) then the four assertions of Martin’s argument are inconsistent, but interpreted as (1″) they may very well be consistent, depending on how one understands assertion (3).

(3) tells us that God must abide by our moral principles. But this depends on what is meant by “our moral principles” in (3). Does it mean: (3′) It is morally impermissible for God to commit, cause, command, or condone acts that violate any moral principle that human beings have adopted?

This cannot be what Martin means because we have sometimes adopted moral principles that are wrong (e.g., the principle that it is permissible to enslave people because of their race). Well, should we read (3) as saying

(3″) It is morally impermissible for God to commit, cause, command, or condone acts that violate moral principles appropriate to his creatures?

If so, then (3) is unacceptable because (3″) is false as we have already seen. It is wrong for me to demand worship but not so for God. Perhaps then (3) is to be read as

(3’’’) It is morally impermissible for God to commit, cause, command, or condone acts that violate moral principles appropriate to God (and/or all rational beings).

(3’’’) is likely true. But it doesn’t create any problems for belief in God unless (4) is understood to mean

(4′) The Bible tells us that God does in fact commit, cause, command, or condone acts that violate moral principles appropriate to God (and/or all rational beings).

Martin likely would affirm (4′). The Christian, however, will need more convincing then Martin provides. He gives several examples from the Bible which, he thinks, involve God in a violation of the right kind of moral principles. For example, he notes that God drowned (almost) the whole human race in the Flood. He also told Joshua to kill all the inhabitants of Jericho, young and old. And, he says, “God will torture a large portion of the human race in Hell for not believing in Jesus” (p. 52).

Do these examples support (4′)? Not at all. First, the biblical text is clear that the Flood is punitive. That is, God drowned the human race in the Flood as punishment for their horrible wickedness. Since one of our (appropriate) moral principles is “evil deserves to be punished,” Martin cannot plausibly hold that God did anything wrong here—unless he wants to argue against capital punishment (which he hasn’t).

Second, just retribution for sin also shows that God has not acted immorally in commanding the execution of the inhabitants of Jericho. Perhaps Martin would object that retributive justice cannot account for the killing of Jericho’s children (he might also make this point in regard to the Flood).

Martin rightly anticipates the Christian’s appeal to the doctrine of original sin. The Bible teaches that human beings are born sinners (Ps. 51:5). And this means that God may justly demand capital punishment from any of us at any age. But, Martin says, “the doctrine of original sin is implausible” (p. 53). Why? Martin offers no reason, and ignores the arguments Christians have given to justify the morality of original sin. Leaving original sin aside, however, the Christian can defend the morality of God’s actions on other grounds, namely, the grounds that something may be permissible for God even though impermissible for us. God is the author of human life. Life in this world is a gift from him. It is not an absolute right that we may demand from him. This being so, it is morally permissible for God to take any life at any time for any good reason he may have. So these examples cannot support (4′).

What about Hell? For one, Martin is wrong to say that people will go to Hell for not believing in Jesus. People go to Hell because they are sinners. People go to Hell for not believing in Jesus no more than the cancer patient dies because he didn’t receive the cure. The cancer patient dies of cancer. Likewise, the sinner goes to Hell because of sin. Secondly, if Hell is the just punishment for sin (and it is), then it is a mistake to call it “torture” as Martin does.

Well, Martin put forward three arguments for nonbelief and missed every time. He struck out in his apology for atheism again. Maybe the next time he comes to the plate he’ll bring a bigger bat!

(First published in Areopagus Journal Vol. 2 No. 1 – The Breath of God)