Biblical & Theological Issues

by Douglas Blount –

Shaphan the secretary informed the king, “The priest Hilkiah has given me a book.” Shaphan then read it aloud to the king. When the king heard the words of the book of the law, he tore his clothes. Then the king commanded the priest Hilkiah, Ahikam son of Shaphan, Achbor son of Micaiah, Shaphan the secretary, and the king’s servant Asaiah, saying, “Go, inquire of the LORD for me, for the people, and for all Judah, concerning the words of this book that has been found; for great is the wrath of the LORD that is kindled against us, because our ancestors did not obey the words of this book, to do according to all that is written concerning us.” 2 Kings 22:10-13, NRSV

So deep was King Josiah’s respect for scripture that, on hearing Shaphan read the books of the law, he rent his clothes in sorrow. Or, at least, so the passage quoted above seems to indicate. Now consider the situation of someone who reads this passage and on the basis of it believes that, on hearing Shaphan read the books of the law, Josiah tore his clothes. Is it reasonable for one to believe that Josiah tore his clothes simply because scripture affirms that he did? Is it reasonable in general to believe something on the grounds that scripture affirms it? In what follows, I attempt to show that it is reasonable to believe something simply because the Bible says it’s so.

Some Prefatory Remarks
Before taking up the task of showing this, however, a few prefatory remarks need to be made.

Knowledge and Rationality

First, as those familiar with contemporary theories of knowledge know, many different accounts of knowledge and rationality have been put forward.¹ And, while there isn’t room here to discuss this vast multitude of accounts, I want at least to provide a sketch of the conceptions of knowledge and rationality at work in what follows.² Put roughly, the notion of rationality employed below goes as follows: if both the means by which one arrives at a particular belief are quite likely to lead to truth and one has no convincing reason for giving up that belief, it is reasonable for one to hold that belief; otherwise, it is not. But what does it mean for the means by which one arrives at a belief to be quite likely to lead to truth? Well, not too surprisingly, it means that the beliefs brought about by them are quite likely to be true. So, for instance, suppose that Lucy believes that Ricky is at the club because it seems to her that she sees him there. Now, assuming that beliefs which Lucy forms in this way normally turn out to be true, the means by which she comes to believe that Ricky is at the club are quite likely to lead to truth. Thus, assuming that she has no convincing reason for ceasing to believe that Ricky is at the club, it is reasonable for her to believe that he is there.

Contrast this with Ethel’s situation: she believes that Fred is in the room not because she has an ordinary visual experience of him there (that is, not because she sees him there as Lucy sees Ricky at the club) but rather because her crystal ball seems to her to indicate that he is there. In this case, the means of arriving at belief which Ethel employs surely aren’t quite likely to lead to truth: beliefs formed at the behest of a crystal ball aren’t likely to be true. Hence, even if Fred is in the room, it isn’t reasonable for Ethel to believe that he is there solely on the basis of what her crystal ball seems to her to say. So, if both the means by which one comes to believe that, say, Josiah tore his clothes are quite likely to lead to truth and one has no convincing reason for ceasing to believe this, it is reasonable for one to believe that he did so. Otherwise, it’s not.

Now let us again consider Lucy’s situation. Suppose that she comes to believe that Ricky is at the club in the way mentioned above: she enters the club, seems to herself to see him there, comes to believe that he is at the club, and has no convincing reason for ceasing to believe this. In such a case, I have suggested, her belief is reasonable. Suppose further that, as Lucy believes, Ricky is in fact at the club. In this case, the following is true: Ricky is at the club; Lucy believes that he is at the club, and it is reasonable for her to believe that he is at the club. Here I think that we have a case of knowledge: Lucy doesn’t merely believe that Ricky is at the club, she knows that he is there. In short, one who reasonably believes something which is in fact true knows that thing. So, if both one reasonably believes that, say, Josiah tore his clothes and Josiah in fact tore his clothes, then one knows that he did so.

The Doctrine of Inerrancy

My second prefatory remark concerns the doctrine of inerrancy. For those unfamiliar with this doctrine, the standard statement of it goes as follows: the term “inerrant signifies the quality of being free from all falsehood or mistake and so safeguards the truth that Holy Scripture is entirely true and trustworthy in all its assertions.”³ In short, then, to say that scripture is inerrant amounts to saying that it makes no false affirmations, assertions, or claims. Whatever it affirms, asserts, or claims is true. And, of course, the doctrine of inerrancy is that doctrine according to which scripture is inerrant.

Notice that affirming this doctrine does not amount to affirming a flat-footed literalism which ignores the subtleties of genre and language implicit in the biblical texts.⁴ Scripture contains such diverse types of literature as apocalyptic literature, epistolary literature, historical narrative, poetry, and wisdom literature. In affirming the doctrine of inerrancy, one need not— indeed, one ought not—give up one’s sensitivity to the subtle nuances of these diverse literary genres. Nor need one ignore the complexities of human language arising from the biblical authors’ use of figures of speech, hyperbole, metaphor, and the like. So, while John 15:1 records Jesus’ claim to be “the true vine,” no inerrantist of whom I’m aware concludes that He needs to be staked down, watered regularly, and prevented from getting too much sunlight! So, while inerrantists agree that everything scripture affirms, asserts, or claims is true, they very well might—and in fact often do—disagree about what certain passages of scripture actually affirm, assert, or claim. So then, one ought not confuse commitment to the doctrine of inerrancy with commitment to a particular set of interpretations of the Bible.

Now, if it’s reasonable for one to believe that scripture is inerrant, it’s reasonable for one to believe that, say, Josiah tore his clothes simply on the grounds that scripture says he did so. Indeed, if it’s reasonable for one to believe the doctrine of inerrancy, it’s reasonable in general for one to believe something solely on the basis of scripture. So, in what follows, I attempt to show it to be reasonable for one to believe the doctrine of inerrancy. If this attempt succeeds, it follows that it is also reasonable for one to believe something simply because the Bible says it’s so.⁵

Dear Christians. . .

Third, in attempting to show this, I address my remarks to Christians. For, with respect to the relationship between believing the doctrine of inerrancy and faith in Christ, at least two possibilities present themselves. First, one might become convinced that scripture is inerrant and, on this basis, come to have faith in Christ. Second, one might come to have faith in Christ and then come to believe that scripture is inerrant. Now, while it’s possible that one come first to believe the doctrine of inerrancy and then to faith in Christ, I doubt that many people actually do so. Rather, I suspect that in most cases belief that scripture is inerrant results from—rather than brings about— faith in Christ. Now I don’t mean this to imply that believing scripture to be inerrant is an inevitable consequence of faith in Christ and that those who don’t believe this aren’t really Christians. Many Christians don’t believe that scripture is inerrant. And, of course, this makes them no less Christian than those who do believe it to be inerrant. My point here is simply that most of those who believe scripture to be inerrant come to believe this after—rather than before—they come to faith in Christ. So, while attempts to persuade those who lack faith in Christ that it’s reasonable to believe the doctrine of inerrancy aren’t likely to have much apologetic value, I think that attempts to persuade Christians of this are likely to meet with success. Thus, what follows is intended primarily for those within— rather than those without—the church.⁶

The Possibility of an Inerrant Book  

In what follows, I take for granted the possibility that scripture is inerrant. ⁷ That there be a book (or collection of books) which makes no false affirmations, assertions, or claims seems possible. And, moreover, that a divinely revealed book (or collection of books) make no false affirmations, assertions, or claims certainly seems possible. After all, God is both omnipotent and omniscient; if He were unable to reveal Himself via an inerrant book (or collection of books), it would be rather surprising! So, as a revelation from God, the Bible surely could be inerrant. Or, at least, so it seems to me. But, of course, that scripture is possibly inerrant doesn’t mean that it’s actually inerrant. Nor does it mean that one who believes it to be inerrant is reasonable to do so.⁸ And, since I think that one can reasonably believe the doctrine of inerrancy, I now turn to the task of showing that one can.⁹

The First Case of Belief: There Is
a Tree In Front of Me

Let us begin this task by considering a typical belief: I seem to myself to see a tree in front of me and, as I have this visual experience, find myself believing that there is a tree in front of me. Is it reasonable for me to believe this? Well, recall that, in order for a belief to be reasonable, it must be the case both that I have no convincing reason for giving it up and that the means by which I arrived at it are quite likely to lead to truth (in the sense that beliefs brought about by them are quite likely to be true). Now I would have a convincing reason for giving up the belief that there is a tree in front of me if, say, I came to reasonably believe that I was at my local computer store testing virtual reality glasses.¹⁰ For, in such a case, I would have reason to doubt that my visual experience of seeming to myself to see a tree in front of me indicates that there actually is a tree in front of me. But, since in this case I have no reason not to take my experience of seeming to myself to see a tree at face value, I have no reason for giving up my belief that there is a tree in front of me.

So, if the means by which I arrived at this belief are quite likely to lead to truth, it’s reasonable for me to hold it. But are they? Well, ordinarily when I take my visual experiences at face value and believe what they seem to tell me, what I believe turns out to be true. So, it would seem, the means by which I came to believe that there is a tree in front of me are quite likely to lead to truth. And, in that case, it’s reasonable for me to believe that there is a tree in front of me. Moreover, if there actually is a tree in front of me, then I don’t merely believe but rather know that there is a tree in front of me.

The Second Case of Belief: Josiah Tore His Clothes.

Let’s consider another belief: I’m reading 2 Kings 22 and, as I read this passage, find myself believing that, on hearing Shaphan read the books of the law, Josiah tore his clothes. Is it reasonable for me to believe this? Well, let’s assume that I have no convincing reason to give up this belief. So, for instance, I don’t have good reason to believe that the passage is the invention of politically motivated priests concerned to insert a pro-Judahite passage into the otherwise sordid history of Judah’s kings. Now, in the absence of good reasons to abandon my belief that Josiah tore his clothes, whether it’s reasonable for me to hold this belief depends on whether the means by which I have come to hold it are quite likely to lead to truth (that is, on whether beliefs brought about by those means are quite likely to be true). Are they? Clearly, how we answer this question hinges on how exactly we think that I came to hold it.

How have I come to believe that Josiah tore his clothes? Well, obviously enough, I’ve come to believe this by way of reading 2 Kings 22. But, on the Christian account of things, this isn’t the whole story. For, on that account, a believer who reads 2 Kings 22—or any other biblical passage—can expect assistance from the Holy Spirit in doing so. Of the Holy Spirit, Jesus says to his disciples,

“When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth; for he will not speak on his own, but will speak whatever he hears, and he will declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, because he will take what is mine and declare it to you” (John 16:13-14; see also 1 Cor. 2:10-12).

Within the early church, this passage was taken to mean that the Holy Spirit bears witness to Christians of the truth.¹¹ And, as C. Stephen Evans points out,¹² that the Holy Spirit makes known to Christians the truth of biblical passages finds explicit statement in some of the later creeds.¹³ So, on the Christian view of things, I seem to have good reasons for thinking that the Holy Spirit has guided my reading of 2 Kings 22.¹⁴

Now, assuming that the Holy Spirit has in fact guided this reading, the means by which I’ve come to believe that Josiah tore his clothes include the Spirit’s having guided me to do so. And, of course, it’s hard to imagine a more reliable means of coming to believe something than the guidance of the Holy Spirit! Thus, assuming that the Holy Spirit has guided my reading of 2 Kings 22, the means by which I’ve come to believe that Josiah tore his clothes are quite likely to lead to truth and I have no convincing reason for ceasing to believe that he did so. And, in this case, it’s reasonable for me to believe that Josiah tore his clothes. Moreover, if Josiah did in fact tear his clothes, then I don’t merely believe but rather know that he did so.

The Third Case of Belief: Scripture Is Inerrant.

Let’s consider yet another belief: on coming to faith in Christ, Charity diligently studies the Bible, faithfully attends her church’s worship services, and regularly fellowships with other believers. Over time, as she immerses herself in such activities, her confidence in the trustworthiness of scripture grows. As she studies the Bible, she finds herself amazed at the insights which she gains from it, at the accuracy with which it portrays the human condition, at how it addresses her own deepest desires and needs, and at the sense of peace which comes as she seeks to live in accordance with its claims. During worship services, she finds herself affirming with an ever-growing confidence the historic doctrines of the faith and singing hymns of praise to God with an ever-deepening sense of ownership. And, as she spends time with other Christians, she discovers that, rather than being unique, her experiences seem to be repeated many times over in the lives of other believers.

Now suppose that, in the course of these events, Charity comes to believe that the Bible is inerrant. Is her belief reasonable? For the moment, let’s assume that she has no convincing reason for giving up this belief.¹⁵ In such a case, whether her belief in the inerrancy of scripture turns out to be reasonable depends on how she came to have it. How has she come to have it? Well, it seems plausible to see Charity’s belief as the product of her experiences with the Bible together with her involvement in the life of her church. And, as mentioned above, the Christian account of things gives us good reasons to think that the Holy Spirit works both within the lives of individual believers as well as within the church to bring them to truth. So, on that account of things, we have good reasons to believe that the Holy Spirit has worked through both her reading of scripture and her church activities to bring her to believe that the Bible is inerrant. And so, just as I have good reasons to think that my reading of 2 Kings 22 has been guided by the Holy Spirit, we have good reasons to see Charity’s belief in the inerrancy of scripture as the result of the Spirit’s work both within the church in general and in her in particular. Now, assuming that the Holy Spirit has in fact worked to bring Charity to believe scripture to be inerrant, the means by which she has come to believe this turn out to be quite likely to lead to truth. And, in this case, it also turns out to be reasonable for her to believe that the Bible is inerrant. Moreover, if the Bible actually is inerrant, Charity not only believes but rather knows that it is.

But don’t Christians sometimes arrive at incompatible beliefs? And don’t they sometimes claim that in doing so they have been led by the Holy Spirit? So, for instance, haven’t some Christians concluded from such passages as 1 John 2:2 that Jesus’ death atoned for every person’s sins while others have concluded that His death atoned only for the sins of Christians? And, in coming to these conclusions, haven’t both groups believed themselves to have been led by the Holy Spirit? Shouldn’t cases such as this make us dubious about appeals to the Holy Spirit? How can we tell which—if either—of them is correct? Determining when the Holy Spirit is—or isn’t—at work isn’t always an easy Matter! But doesn’t this undermine the reasonableness of Charity’s belief that scripture is inerrant?

No. For, while it might be difficult for Charity—or anyone else—to tell whether her belief that the Bible is inerrant results from the Holy Spirit’s guidance, what makes her belief reasonable (in the absence of convincing reasons for giving it up) is not that she can tell it resulted from the Spirit’s work but rather that it actually did result from the Spirit’s work. Here it’s important to recognize the difference between the Holy Spirit’s work in one’s life and one’s awareness of that work.¹⁶ What makes one’s belief reasonable (in the absence of convincing reasons for giving it up) is that the means by which one comes to have it actually are quite likely to lead one to truth. And, of course, it’s possible that the means by which I come to believe something be quite likely to lead me to truth even though I’m unaware of them. So, even if Charity can’t tell that her belief has resulted from the work of the Holy Spirit, it might nonetheless have in fact resulted from the Spirit’s work. And, in such a case, her belief is reasonable. Or so it is as long as she has no convincing reason to give it up.

What Would Convince Us That Scripture Isn’t Inerrant?

So far I have suggested that, in the absence of convincing reasons to cease believing that scripture is inerrant, it might be reasonable for one to believe it to be so. For, I have suggested, the Christian account of things gives believers good reasons to think that the Holy Spirit works both within their lives and within the church to bring them to truth. Given this, it seems plausible (at least from a Christian point of view) to regard beliefs which Christians come to have as they immerse themselves within the life of the Christian community as the product of the Holy Spirit’s work both within them individually and within the church corporately. And, if these beliefs do in fact result from the Holy Spirit’s work, those in whom the Spirit has brought them about are in fact reasonable to hold them. So it seems plausible to regard as reasonable one’s belief that the Bible is most commonly cited reason for thinking that the Bible errs (and thus that it isn’t inerrant) is that it appears to contradict itself. So, for instance, a friend of mine once announced to me that he had given up believing the Bible to be inerrant because he had found a contradiction in it. Surprised by this, I asked him to show me this contradiction. He referred me to two passages of scripture, one of which (Luke 11:23) seems to indicate that Jesus said those who are not for Him are against Him and the other of which (Mark 9:40) seems to indicate that Jesus said those who are not against Him are for Him. Clearly, my friend argued, these texts indicate that Jesus contradicted Himself. But, assuming that Jesus wouldn’t contradict Himself, it follows from this that these texts aren’t both true. Of course, if they aren’t both true, then at least one of them is false. And, in that case, scripture is not inerrant.

Now at least two things are worth noting here. First, the Bible’s being inerrant does entail its being logically consistent. Or, to put the point differently, it’s not possible both that scripture be inerrant and that it make logically inconsistent claims. And, moreover, this fact underlies my friend’s reason for ceasing to believe the Bible to be inerrant. For, of course, his reason amounts to pointing to an alleged inconsistency in scripture and concluding from it that scripture is not inerrant. Now, insofar as it rests on the fact that the Bible can be inerrant only if it makes no inconsistent claims, my friend’s reasoning appears to be well-founded. Where he goes astray, however, is in thinking that he has found two scriptural claims which are in fact inconsistent. I shall return to this point in a moment.

Second, it also seems worth noting that whether one thinks one has found inconsistencies in scripture depends (at least in part) on the assumptions with which one has approached it. To see this, consider the passages mentioned above, Luke 11:23 and Mark 9:40, which go as follows:

Whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters (Luke 11:23, NRSV).

Whoever is not against us is for us (Mark 9:40, NRSV).

Let’s assume that my friend has read these passages correctly. On this assumption, Luke 11:23 indicates that Jesus said those who aren’t for Him are against Him and Mark 9:40 indicates that Jesus said those who aren’t against Him are for Him. What led my friend to conclude that these passages are at odds with one another? Well, as I understood him, he took Luke 11:23 to be saying that those who take a neutral position with respect to Jesus are in fact against Him and Mark 9:40 to be saying that those who take such a position are in fact for Him. So, he concluded, scripture indicates that those who are neutral with respect to Jesus are both against Him and for Him. And, in such a case, scripture contradicts itself.¹⁷

Of course, neither Luke 11 nor Mark 9 explicitly mention those who are neutral with respect to Jesus. So, while these passages mention only two positions which one might take with respect to Jesus (i.e., being for Him and being against Him), my friend assumed that there is a third such position (i.e., being neutral). But, as far as I can see, the point of these passages seems to be that there is no neutral position with respect to Jesus that one is either for Him or against Him. So then my friend’s reading of these passages was driven by an assumption with which he had approached them. And, ironically, the assumption with which he had approached them is itself inconsistent with the point which they seem to be intended to make. Obviously, one who approaches scripture with assumptions which are inconsistent with it is very likely to find things to be amiss. But, of course, this hardly suffices to show anything so momentous as that the Bible errs! Here the error lies not with scripture but with the one who reads it through a veil of assumptions which are themselves contrary to it.

Now I intend these remarks neither to cast aspersions on my friend nor to suggest that we ought to approach scripture without any assumptions. The assumption that one can be neutral with respect to Jesus seems pretty plausible on the face of it. In fact, if it weren’t plausible, there would have been little need for Luke and Mark to record what Jesus said about the matter. So, however unfortunate it might have been, my friend’s approaching scripture as he did is certainly understandable. Moreover, I don’t think it possible to approach scripture—or, for that matter, any other book (or collection of books)—without any assumptions whatsoever. To think otherwise seems to me exceedingly naïve. Still, it matters a great deal which assumptions one approaches scripture with. If one approaches scripture convinced that, say, miracles are impossible, one will have no difficulty finding what one takes to be false claims in it. But, to the extent that one has reason to regard the Bible as inerrant, to that extent one has reason to read it as such.

So, while those who assume that, say, miracles aren’t possible are likely to conclude from certain passages of scripture that it errs, those for whom it’s reasonable to believe the Bible to be inerrant are likely to conclude from such passages that miracles are possible. And, of course, this point can be made more generally. For, while cases of the Bible’s saying such-and-such is true will lead those who believe that such-and-such isn’t true to conclude that the Bible errs, they will lead those who believe that the Bible doesn’t err to conclude that such-and-such is true. Moreover, those for whom it’s reasonable to believe the Bible to be inerrant will be right to make such conclusions. Here a comparison might prove helpful: if it’s reasonable for me to believe you to be a thoroughly reliable witness, then it’s reasonable for me to reject almost anything which conflicts with your testimony; so also, if it’s reasonable for us to believe that scripture is inerrant (and thus thoroughly reliable), it’s reasonable for us to reject almost any statement which conflicts with what it asserts.

Of course, in testifying you might make statements which are inconsistent either with other statements you have made or with statements which I have reasons for believing which outweigh my reasons for believing you to be a thoroughly reliable witness. And, if you were to make such statements, I would have a convincing reason to give up believing that you are a thoroughly reliable witness. Likewise, if scripture were to make statements which are inconsistent either with other statements it makes or with things which we have reasons for believing which outweigh our reasons for believing scripture to be inerrant, we would have a convincing reason to give up believing it to be inerrant. Thus, we aren’t justified in rejecting any statement whatsoever which conflicts with scripture anymore than we are justified in rejecting any statement whatsoever which conflicts with your testimony. Our credulity must have limits!

So, if scripture contradicts itself, it isn’t inerrant. And, if one has a convincing reason to think that scripture does in fact contradict itself, one also has a convincing reason to believe that it isn’t inerrant. Likewise, if one has reasons for believing that a statement made by scripture is false and these reasons outweigh one’s reasons for believing it be inerrant, one cannot reasonably believe it to be inerrant. So, for instance, if one has a convincing reason for rejecting what one takes to be the clear moral teaching of scripture, one also has a convincing reason for believing that scripture errs. Indeed, those who reasonably believe that scripture condones capital punishment (or condemns homosexual activity) but who nonetheless regard its practice as morally indefensible (or morally permissible) find themselves in just this situation provided that their reasons for so regarding it are convincing.

But, of course, the proviso is important here. That scripture makes claims which seem to us implausible isn’t by itself an impressive reason for not thinking it to be inerrant. For, of course, intellectual honesty demands from us a certain humility. Only the most arrogant among us think themselves incapable of error! And, given this fact, we should not be surprised that an inerrant book (or collection of books) makes claims which seem to us implausible.¹⁸ After all, since considerations of humility give us reason to expect some of our beliefs about, say, morality to be false, it would hardly be surprising if some of the moral claims made by an inerrant book (or collection of books) seemed to us to be false. Indeed, it would be surprising if all its claims seemed to us to be true! Thus, the mere appearance of error in scripture does little to undermine belief in its inerrancy. Rather, in order for such belief to be undermined, one’s reasons for thinking that it errs must be convincing. And, as mentioned above, they must be more convincing than one’s reasons for believing it to be inerrant.

Still, while a clear example of an error in scripture would undermine whatever reasons we have for believing it to be inerrant, cases in which scripture clearly errs turn out to be rather hard to find. In fact, I know of no such cases. Nor do I know of any cases in which scripture contradicts itself. And, as long as we have no convincing reason for ceasing to believe the Bible to be inerrant, it will be reasonable for those of us who reasonably believe it to be inerrant to assume it to be so when reading it. So also, as long as it’s reasonable for us to treat the Bible as inerrant, it’s reasonable for us to believe that Josiah tore his clothes simply because the Bible says that he did.

Now it doesn’t follow from this that those who think that scripture errs are thereby being unreasonable. For, of course, those who don’t believe the Bible to be inerrant are likely to have a rather different set of background beliefs than those who do. Perhaps an example will help here. Suppose that I’m driving on an interstate near Dallas. Suppose further that, as I’m driving along at 65 MPH, I notice in my rear view mirror a tiny speck of a car. Although it’s far behind me, I notice this car because it’s moving incredibly fast, weaving in and out of traffic. Cars on either side of it must swerve off the road to avoid being hit by it. It seems to be gaining on me as if I were standing still. Not wanting to be hit by it (or by some other car attempting to get out of its way!), I take the next exit and watch as this car flies by me on the interstate. But, as it passes me, I realize that—much to my surprise—the blur driving the car is none other than my own father!

In such a situation, what would I conclude? Would I conclude that my father is a reckless maniac, unconcerned about the effects which his actions have on others? I don’t think so. For, since I know my father and believe that he would not drive in such a manner without a compelling reason to do so, I probably would conclude that he had a compelling reason for driving in such a manner. And, given what I know about my father, this seems imminently reasonable. But notice that other drivers don’t bring to the situation the same set of background beliefs which I bring. And, given what other beliefs they hold, it might be that the most reasonable conclusion for them to make is that my father is a reckless maniac, unconcerned about how his actions affect others. So then what it’s reasonable for one to believe depends (at least in part) on what other beliefs one has.¹⁹ Thus, given the other beliefs which they have, it might be that those who believe that scripture errs are rational to do so. Still, like those who conclude that my father is a reckless maniac, they are nonetheless mistaken.²⁰

Douglas Blount is Associate Professor of Philosophy of Religion at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. This article is an abridged version of an article that originally appeared under the title, “The Authority of Scripture,” in Reason for the Hope Within, ed. Michael J. Murray (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1999), 399-422. Used by permission.

(First published in Areopagus Journal Vol. 2 No. 1 – The Breath of God)

 NOTES

¹ For a good introduction to contemporary theories of knowledge, see John Pollock’s Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986).

² The sketches of knowledge and rationality which I give have been heavily influenced by William Alston’s Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989) as well as C. Stephen Evans’s discussion of that work in The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith: The Incarnational Narrative as History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

³ Those interested in reading the statement from which this quotation is taken—entitled “The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy”—in its entirety can find it in Norman L. Geisler, ed., Inerrancy (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1980), 493-502.

⁴ The remarks of this paragraph are motivated in part by charges either that inerrantists cannot square their view with what one actually finds in the Bible or else that they can do so only by engaging in intellectual gymnastics of one sort or another. See, for instance, Clark Pinnock’s claims in “Three Views of the Bible in Contemporary Theology,” in Jack Rogers, ed., Biblical Authority (Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1977), 67: “One of the most serious difficulties the theory of errorlessness faces is the Bible itself. To defend it in a way that does not evade the phenomena of the text requires incredible dexterity and ingenuity.”

⁵ Of course, even if one doesn’t believe scripture to be inerrant, it might nonetheless be reasonable for one to believe something simply because scripture affirms it. Now, given what I know about my physical senses, it would be unreasonable for me to believe them to be inerrant. After all, they’ve deceived me in the past. For instance, I’ve seen people who appeared from a distance to be acquaintances, only to find out on closer inspection that they were not. But from this it certainly doesn’t follow that it’s never reasonable for me to believe what these senses seem to tell me simply because they seem to do so. So, even if one doesn’t believe that a source of belief is inerrant, it nonetheless might be reasonable for one to believe what it says simply because it says it.

Now some inerrantists have claimed that denying the doctrine of inerrancy is tantamount to denying biblical authority. For instance, Paul Feinberg states: “To divorce inerrancy and authority is impossible. I have never been able to understand how one can be justified in claiming absolute authority for the Scriptures and at the same time deny their inerrancy. This seems to be the height of epistemological nonsense and confusion” [“The Meaning of Inerrancy,” in Norman L. Geisler, ed., Inerrancy (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1980), 285]. But, in the same way that I can treat my physical senses as authoritative without believing them to be inerrant, it seems that one could treat scripture as authoritative without believing it to be inerrant. Indeed, one who doesn’t affirm the doctrine of inerrancy might nonetheless practice a sort of methodological inerrancy. For, while she believes that scripture might contain errors, she nonetheless might in fact accept whatever scripture says simply on the grounds that scripture says it. And, assuming both that this means of arriving at belief is quite likely to lead to truth and that she has no overriding reason for giving up beliefs arrived at in this way, it’s reasonable for her to proceed in this way even though she doesn’t affirm the doctrine of inerrancy. So then accepting biblical inerrancy is not a prerequisite for reasonably believing what scripture says on the grounds that scripture says it. Still, since one who reasonably believes the doctrine of inerrancy thereby reasonably believes what scripture says on the grounds that scripture says it, I attempt in what follows to show that one can reasonably believe that doctrine.

⁶ However, this does not mean that those outside the church—those who lack faith in Christ—will find nothing of value in what follows. For, if the project attempted below succeeds, they may at the very least gain from it a better understanding of how Christianity looks from the “inside” by seeing how Christians themselves can establish to their own satisfaction—though perhaps not to the satisfaction of their critics—the reasonableness of their commitment to the truth of scripture.

⁷ Since I intend my remarks for Christians, I don’t intend to include in them a defense of scripture’s claim to have been divinely revealed. That scripture is a divine revelation seems to me to be an axiom of the Christian faith. Still, those interested in such a defense will find in Richard Swinburne’s Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), especially pp. 69-97, a good starting point.

⁸ After all, it’s possible that, as I write this, Michael Jordan is eating ice cream. But, since I have no reason for believing him to be doing so, it would be quite unreasonable for me to believe that he is in fact now eating ice cream. Thus, even if it’s possible that something be true, it nonetheless might be unreasonable to believe it to be true.

⁹ In so doing, I employ a strategy similar to, and inspired by, one used by C. Stephen Evans in his excellent work on the historicity of the biblical accounts of Jesus’ life, The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith.

¹⁰ Of course, if at the time at which I began to have the visual experience I already believed myself to be testing virtual reality glasses, this probably would have prevented me from coming to believe that there is a tree in front of me in the first place.

¹¹ For instance, Irenæus (circa 180 A.D.) describes the Holy Spirit as One “who furnishes us with a knowledge of the truth,” and Tertullian (circa 200 A.D.) speaks of being instructed by the Holy Spirit, “the Leader into all truth.” See Philip Schaff, ed., The Creeds of Christendom, Volume II: The Greek and Latin Creeds, reprint of the 6^th edition (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1990), 16-17.

¹² In The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith, 260-62.

¹³ So, for instance, the Belgic Confession (1561) gives as the main reason for accepting the truthfulness of passages of scripture the fact that “the Holy Ghost witnesseth in our hearts that they are from God” and the Westminster Confession of Faith (1647) says of scripture that “our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.” See Article V of the Belgic Confession and Article V of the Westminster Confession of Faith in Philip Schaff, ed., The Creeds of Christendom, Volume III: The Evangelical Protestant Creeds, reprint of 6^th edition (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1990), 386-87 and 602-603.

¹⁴ Of course, one can easily imagine situations in which I’d have reason to doubt that my reading of a biblical passage had been guided by the Holy Spirit. Suppose, for instance, that I read a certain passage (say, Genesis 3:8) in a thoroughly unorthodox way (say, as suggesting that, prior to the Incarnation, God had legs and feet). In such a case, my reason for believing this reading to result from the guidance of the Holy Spirit is undermined by my belief that it is inconsistent with the way in which Christians have traditionally read the passage.

¹⁵ In the next section, I discuss some reasons which one might seem to have for ceasing to believe that scripture is inerrant.

¹⁶ Discussing beliefs brought about in believers by the Holy Spirit, C. Stephen Evans puts this point well: “In any case, the process whereby the Holy Spirit forms such a belief must not be identified with how it appears to the believer. The process must not be identified with an experience, particularly not with an experience that is being construed as evidence. Christians certainly believe it is possible to experience the work of the Holy Spirit, and they regard such an experience as a valuable and precious one. However, the work of the Holy Spirit cannot be regarded as identical with someone’s experience of that work, and it is the work of the Spirit that counts.” See his The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith, 268-69.

¹⁷ Actually, things aren’t quite as clear cut as this. For, even if scripture indicates that those who are neutral with respect to Jesus are both against Him and for Him, it doesn’t follow that scripture contradicts itself unless being both against and for someone isn’t possible. But, as far as I can see, this is possible. So, for instance, George Patton might have been against the Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov insofar as he anticipated that the Soviet Union would be the principle opponent of the U.S. in the post-war era and at the same time for Zhukov insofar as the two men faced a common enemy in Nazi Germany.

¹⁸ I owe this point to Thomas Morris.

¹⁹ I assume that one’s background beliefs usually play a role in one’s coming to have other beliefs.

²⁰ In addition to the contributors to Reason for the Hope Within, I’m grateful to John Adair, D. Jeffrey Bingham, Todd Cathey, and Glenn Kreider for helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.